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Abstract | Five years have passed since the implementation of the “three arrows” of 
Abenomics—bold monetary policy, agile fiscal policy, and growth strategies to 
stimulate private investment. Indeed, the Japanese economy has slowly started to 
recover and has shown signs of escaping from its long-term recession. Such signs 
include the weakening of the yen, rising stock prices, and improved conditions for 
employment. However, in addition to Abenomics, international affairs have also had an 
impact on the weakening of the yen and rising stock prices. Also, employment 
conditions improved largely due to changes in the population structure, rather than 
Abenomics. The decrease in the population lowers the potential growth rate. In Japan, 
the labor force is declining, wages are not rising, and private consumption is not 
increasing at all. As a result, people have not realized the boom Abenomics has brought. 
Knowing these problems, the Abe administration sought to change direction in 2016. 
The first stage of Abenomics, which focused on the problem of the lack of aggregate 
demand, tried to stimulate reflation with quantitative easing. However, it encountered 
some challenges and its limitations were revealed. The second stage of Abenomics 
focuses on labor reforms as a growth strategy in order to solve the constraint problem 
of aggregate supply. In the end, the success of Abenomics depends on labor reforms that 
aim to change Japan’s ingrained labor practices.
Keywords | Abenomics, weak boom (teion kōkyō), monetary policy, quantitative easing, 
growth strategy
Introduction 
There is a widespread perception that the Japanese economy, which had suffered 
following the global financial crisis triggered by Lehman shock in 2008, is 
recovering due to the economic policy package called Abenomics. After the 
implementation of Abenomics, the yen remained weak, share prices recovered, 
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and the employment index hit a record high. The Composite Index released by 
the Cabinet Office indicates that the Japanese economy started its sixteenth 
cycle from the end of 2012. This economic boom has lasted for over sixty 
months (as of December 2017). It is the second longest boom, following the 
Izanami boom (Izanami keiki) during the Koizumi Jun’ichirō administration 
that lasted for seventy-three months. Does this mean Abenomics has rescued 
the Japanese economy? The change of direction for Abenomics in 2016 could 
possibly answer this question. 
The initial policy goals of Abenomics projected a rise of two percent in 
consumer price inflation, three percent in nominal growth rate, and two percent 
in real growth rate. Taking office as the governor of the Bank of Japan in March 
2013, Kuroda Haruhiko reconfirmed the goal of consumer price inflation at two 
percent. Moreover, the “Japan Rehabilitation Strategy” (Nihon Saikō Senryaku), 
which was announced in June 2013, restated the nominal growth rate of three 
percent and real growth rate of two percent as its goals (Taniguchi 2015, 1-2).1 
To achieve these goals, Abenomics proposed the three arrows of bold monetary 
policy, agile fiscal policy, and growth strategies to stimulate private investment. 
Evaluating the past five years, Abenomics is an economic policy package that 
has been partially revised in tandem with changes in the economic condition, 
rather than a consistent economic policy. 
Indeed, Abenomics entered a new stage in 2016 with big changes to the 
policy. In September 2016, there was a major shift in monetary policy to 
implement quantitative and qualitative monetary easing with short-term and 
long-term interest rate adjustment. Prior to the change, Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō had presented three new arrows of Abenomics in October 2015. In 
addition, there was the cabinet mandate entitled “All One Hundred Million 
Taking Active Parts Plan” (Nippon Ichioku Sōkatsuyaku Puran). Abenomics then 
officially entered its second stage, which focused on growth strategy. These 
changes in monetary policy and the shift of focus to growth policy arose from a 
common concern. In fact, the year of 2016 became an inflection point for 
Abenomics. 
I will clarify the specific background in which the each of the three arrows 
of Abenomics was included in the economic policy package and evaluate the 
economic performance of Abenomics. Moreover, paying special attention to the 
change of direction for Abenomics in 2016, I will identify the key factors that 
1. Unlike the previous government under the Democratic Party of Japan, which emphasized the 
independence of the central bank, the Abe administration tightened political pressure on the 
central bank. This eventually led the government and Bank of Japan to announce a joint statement 
about the inflation goal of two percent. 
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would lead to the policy’s success.
The Background for the Emergence of Abenomics 
1. The Causes of the Long-Term Recession2
Prior to understanding the background for Abenomics, it is necessary to look at 
the long-term recession in Japan. The recession began in the early 1990s with 
the collapse of asset prices. The Plaza Accord in 1985 and the resulting 
overreaction due to a strong yen created a bubble that burst in 1990-91. As a 
result, the per capita GDP growth rate dropped to 0.3 percent in 1992. Following 
the oil shock in 1993, the growth rate fell to minus 0.2 percent for the first time. 
For the next twenty years, Japan went through a long-term recession, with per 
capita GDP growth rate remaining at 0.6 percent until December 2012, when 
Abenomics was enacted.3 
There are two distinct characteristics of this recession. First, a decline in the 
potential GDP growth rate and a negative GDP gap took place simultaneously. 
Potential GDP growth represents the mid to long-term growth rate that a 
country’s economy can reach. If the potential GDP growth rate decreases, the 
economic growth will also fall, even if a hundred percent of the available 
production factors are used. In addition, a GDP gap is the difference between 
potential GDP and actual GDP. A negative GDP gap means that the economy is 
not producing as much as its current potential. In other words, the long-term 
recession in Japan posed problems for both the supply side and the demand 
side. Second, there were long-term deflation and liquidity traps. The monthly 
average for the consumer price inflation rate was minus 0.1 percent from 1995 
to 2012. Japan was the only major developed country to record a negative 
average inflation rate for such a long time, and this long deflation caused the 
liquidity trap. 
The decline in potential growth rate indicates a problem with aggregate 
2. See Pak Sang-jun (2016, 60-119) for more information.
3. In the same period, France grew by 1.0 percent, Germany by 1.1 percent, and the US by 1.6 
percent. Comparing the growth rate to developed countries, Japan’s growth rate was not 
particularly low at all. Their long-term recession drew attention not because of the low growth rate 
but because of the rapid change in growth rate. During the period from 1975 to 1991 when Japan 
recovered from the first oil shock, Japan grew by 3.6 percent, while France rose by 1.9 percent, 
Germany by 2.5 percent, and the US by 1.9 percent. Japan’s growth rate sharply dropped compared 
to other developed countries.
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supply. As shown in figure 1, the potential growth rate has been continuously 
decreasing since the collapse of the bubble. In order for potential GDP to grow, 
it is necessary to increase production factors, including labor force, human 
capital, and physical capital, or to improve total factor productivity. The changes 
in the population structure brought by low fertility and aging have resulted in a 
decrease in the labor force. Japan’s working-age population started to shrink in 
1999, while the peak of the population for people in their twenties to fifties was 
around 1995.
However, the labor shortage alone did not cause the aggregate supply slump 
during the recession. According to Hayashi and Prescott (2002), the slowdown 
in the growth of total factor productivity was the most fundamental cause of 
Japan’s economic downturn in the 1990s. They show that the annual average for 
the growth rate of total factor productivity from 1983 to 1991 was 3.7 percent, 
and the economic growth rate was 3.6 percent during the same period. The 
annual average for the growth rate of total factor productivity from 1991 to 2000 
was 0.3 percent and the economic growth rate was 0.5 percent during the same 
period. In other words, the growth rate of total factor productivity sharply 
declined, so the economic growth rate also fell. In the end, in order to solve the 
long-term recession, it is necessary to increase productivity through structural 
reforms that include eliminating zombie enterprises, reducing non-performing 
loans, and privatizing public enterprises with low productivity.
Japan’s long-term recession is not just a problem of aggregate supply. In 
Source: Processed by the author upon raw data from Nihon Ginkō (n.d.). 
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figure 1, the negative GDP gap indicates a deficit in aggregate demand. 
Considering the dates between the collapse of the bubble and Abenomics, those 
periods from the second quarter of 1993 to the fourth quarter of 1995, from the 
first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2005, and from the third quarter of 
2008 to the third quarter of 2013, have negative GDP gaps. During the recession 
in the 1990s, the GDP gap remained negative except for 1996-97. This illustrates 
that the lack of aggregate demand was the cause of the recession. The Japanese 
government had planned to increase the aggregate demand through financial 
and fiscal policies several times to solve these problems. 
On the other hand, the second characteristic, long-term deflation and the 
liquidity trap, distinguish Japan’s long-term recession from the low growth of 
the US and Europe. The liquidity trap is a situation in which economic agents 
are making pessimistic predictions so that even if the interest rate is low, there is 
no room for consumption or investment to be stimulated. It could also be a 
situation in which the interest rate is already so low that it cannot be lowered 
more. This paralyzes the central bank’s interest rate policy. Krugman et al. 
(1998) assert that expected deflation had put the Japanese economy into a 
liquidity trap. In other words, if economic agents anticipate that deflation will 
become more intense in the future, they will delay current consumption, and 
the decline in consumption will lead to deteriorating sales performance of 
companies, resulting in job and wage cuts. This leads consumption to decrease 
even more. In addition, expected deflation has the effect of lowering investment 
by increasing real interest rates. Eventually, the decrease in consumption and 
investment leads to further deflation, and this vicious cycle creates a deflationary 
spiral, causing the economy to be stuck. Krugman’s prescription for this is to 
defeat the expected deflation through quantitative easing. By shifting expected 
deflation to expected inflation through a policy of unrestricted monetary base 
expansion until the appropriate level of inflation is firmly established, the 
economy can escape from the vicious deflation cycle. 
2. The Result of the Policy Debate: The Bold Monetary Policy 
To place the three arrows of Abenomics with the policies explained above, the 
first and second arrows, monetary policy and fiscal policy,  fall under the 
category of aggregate demand policy. The third arrow, growth strategy, fits with 
the aggregate supply policy. As a policy package, Abenomics includes both 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Nevertheless, a bold monetary policy 
of quantitative easing was the primary means for implementing Abenomics. In 
fact, Abenomics was not the first policy to introduce quantitative easing. 
42  LEE Chang-Min
At the beginning of the Koizumi Administration, Japan became the first 
country to implement quantitative easing in March 2001. As shown in table 1, 
prior to Abenomics, quantitative easing policy took place from March 2001 to 
March 2006. Japan increased the monetary base from five to six trillion yen. 
Table 1. Financial Policies of Bank of Japan
Period Financial Policy Goal and Tool
February 
1999
Zero-interest-rate policy Target call rate at zero 
March 2001 Quantitative easing Change of target from the uncollateralized 
call rate to the balance of current account 
Continue with the zero-interest-rate policy
March 2006 End of quantitative easing Change of target from the balance of current 
account to the uncollateralized call rate 









Comprehensive easy money 
policy
Purchase national bond, corporate bond, 
ETF, J-REIT
Real zero interest rate policy
January 2013 Set a goal for inflation rate Stated the goal of inflation rate at two percent
April 2013 Quantitative and qualitative 
easing policy
Change of target from call rate to checking 
account balance 
Expand the amount of long-term national 




Expansion of quantitative 
and qualitative easing 
policy
Expand the increase range for monetary base, 
Expand the amount of long-term national 
bond
Expand the purchase of ETF, J-REIT
February 
2016
Quantitative and qualitative 
easing policy with negative 
interest rate
Apply interest rate of minus 0.1 percent
for some financial institutions’ checking 
accounts in Bank of Japan 
September 
2016
Quantitative and qualitative 
easing policy with short-




Note: The period of Abenomics is shaded in the table. 
Source: Compiled by the author.
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Then it expanded from thirty to thirty-five trillion yen from 2004. The 
economic team in the Koizumi Administration was aware of the lack of 
aggregate demand. Thus, it accepted Krugman’s idea of quantitative easing on 
an experimental basis in 1998. The result turned out to be successful.4 Under the 
Koizumi Administration, Japan enjoyed the Izanami Boom, which was the 
longest economic boom in the postwar period. The Bank of Japan declared the 
end of the quantitative easing policy in March 2006 when it was certain that 
Japan was in a boom cycle. 
However, the reflationists’ idea of solving the problem of the aggregate 
demand deficit by quantitative easing was not a core economic policy of the 
Koizumi administration. With structural reformers who sought to solve the 
problem of aggregate supply constraints, the Koizumi administration prioritized 
the improvement of the Japanese economic system (Yi Chŏng-hwan 2016, 244). 
For example, the administration focused on fiscal consolidation policies, non-
performing loans disposal, and privatization of public enterprises. As a result, 
the ratio of non-performing bank loans, which grew to 8.7 percent in 2001, 
declined to 2.7 percent in 2006. In addition, the primary balance of GDP, an 
indicator of fiscal sustainability, was close to zero percent.
The second Abe administration thoroughly grasped the idea of the 
reflationists. Resigning from his first term as the prime minister in 2007, Abe 
had learned about the reflationists’ theories through Yamamoto Kozō, a famous 
reflationist from the Liberal Democratic Party. After his return as prime 
minister, Abe appointed Hamada Kōichi and Honda Etsurō as special advisors 
to the cabinet (naikaku kanpō sanyo), and Iwata Kikuo as deputy governor of 
the Bank of Japan. With these famous reflationists in his government, Abe 
successfully implemented their ideas into Abenomics.5 Moreover, the fact that 
the US and Europe applied quantitative easing after the Lehman shock convinced 
Abe to follow the same path.6 
4. There were some criticisms on Koizumi’s achievements in quantitative easing policy. The critics 
said that the scale of quantitative easing was not large enough and it was over in a hurry, even 
before deflation had completely disappeared. However, there was some success. Koizumi’s policy 
led economic recovery through the Izanami boom with the depreciation of the yen and strong 
exports. 
5. For more information about implementation of reflationist’s idea, see Yi Chŏng-hwan (2016, 
243-45).
6. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis caused by the Lehman shock, the US implemented QE 1 
(Quantitative Easing 1: November 2008–June 2010) which was large-scale financial easing. Then it 
implemented QE 2 (November 2010–June 2011) and QE 3 (September 2012–October 2014) in a 
row. With the economic recovery, the six-year of quantitative easing period ended in October 
2014. The European Central Bank also introduced quantitative easing immediately after the 
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As a result, the quantitative easing of Abenomics turned out to have 
different characteristics than that of Koizumi and his successors. The most 
significant trait of Abenomics is that “it used all the available means on a large 
scale.” As shown in table 1, when the financial crisis began, the Bank of Japan 
had already purchased CP and corporate bonds. In 2010, when the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) was in power, the Bank of Japan expanded financial easing 
policy, purchasing ETF (exchange traded fund) and J-REIT (Japanese real estate 
investment trust). The quantitative easing by Abenomics did all of these on a 
much larger scale and conveyed its size to the market with clear numbers, such 
as two years, two times, and two percent. Finally, Abenomics was a time-based 
policy that encouraged market speculation by promising unlimited quantitative 
easing.7 These are the three distinct characteristics of Abenomics. As a matter of 
fact, the first arrow of Abenomics, a bold monetary policy, has emphasis on the 
adjective “bold” rather than monetary policy itself. 
3. Strategic Choice: Agile Fiscal Policy 
After the policy debate, there was no dispute that quantitative easing should 
take place ahead of structural reform. However, fiscal policy was a strategic 
choice in which Prime Minister Abe’s personal experience played a crucial role. 
When his first cabinet was established, Abe had no particular ideas regarding 
economic policy. In his speech at a press conference on September 26, 2006, 
Prime Minister Abe showed his willingness to promote a growth strategy to 
combat low fertility and an aging society. He promised to improve productivity 
through technological innovation. He also mentioned launching a reform of the 
social security system. His reform included pensions, medical care, and nursing. 
In addition, Abe stated that he would reduce expenditures and the amount of 
government bonds issued for financial reconstruction. Indeed, Abe meant to 
succeed Koizumi’s structural reforms and hardly anything was new.8 Abe’s 
cabinet did not realize that they would need a new economic policy because 
they were quite confident about the economic recovery after March 2006 when 
quantitative easing ended. 
Abe was interested in other areas, and he adopted a series of strong 
conservative policies. The Abe administration had turned rightist. It established 
Lehman shock and implemented it until August 2012.
7. For the difference between the financial policy of the DPJ and Abenomics, see Taniguchi (2015, 
4-5).
8. For information about the economic policy of the First Abe Cabinet, see Fujita (2006).
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the National Voting Act through the Constitutional Amendment Procedures, 
passed three laws related to education in the House of Representatives, and 
deliberated a bill to reform the public service system. In the meantime, his 
approval rating plummeted. When the Abe administration took the office, it 
had an approval rate of sixty-three percent. However, the approval rate fell after 
some Diet members who had opposed the postal privatization during Koizumi 
administration, returned to his party. They gave an impression of renegades 
who deviated from the Koizumi reform line. In addition, Yanagisawa Hakuo, 
minister of health, labor and welfare, used improper language, calling women 
“birth-giving machines” (umu kikai), and Abe’s approval rate fell again due to 
the inadequate response to the statement. Moreover, about fifty-million pension 
records disappeared, leading the approval rate to drop to thirty percent. The Abe 
administration collapsed. To make matters worse, Abe’s health had deteriorated, 
and so he left office one year after his inauguration.
The Japanese economy, which had overcome the lost decade and entered 
into a long-term boom, fell into recession again in 2008 due to the global 
financial crisis. After the first Abe administration, Japan underwent political 
turmoil, replacing five prime ministers in five years. The Japanese economy 
sank into a pit during this period. In August 2009, when the dissatisfaction and 
distrust toward the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) peaked, the voters punished 
the LDP by voting for another party in the House of Representatives. With the 
landslide victory, the DPJ asserted income-led growth through income 
redistribution. However, there were overwhelming social welfare pledges that 
created difficulty in raising funds. The economy in the recession did not show 
any signs of recovery for a few years (Song Sŏk-wŏn and Kong Chŏng-sŭng 
2013, 255-56).9 At the same time, the Great East Japan Earthquake struck the 
Japanese economy, accelerating the collapse of the DPJ administration. 
During the debates over the reconstruction bonds for the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, Abe seized an opportunity to rise again (Pak Sang-jun 2016, 143-
46). On May 4, 2011, he gave a lecture entitled “How to Set Japan on the Right 
Track?” (Ika ni Nihon o tatenaosu ka) at Reitaku University. He argued that the 
government should issue reconstruction bonds to recover from the devastation 
caused by the earthquake. On June 16, 211 Diet members, including Abe, 
announced a statement that supported the issuance of reconstruction bonds. 
Abe, who had insisted on fiscal consolidation in his first cabinet, conversely 
insisted on active fiscal spending four years later. Because of the experience 
9. To achieve every pledge of the DPJ’s welfare commitments, the government needed about 16.8 
trillion yen. However, only 3.9 trillion yen was allocated for the period.
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from the Great East Japan Earthquake, it was possible to shift from fiscal 
consolidation to allowing aggressive fiscal spending. This helped Abe to build 
Abenomics’ second arrow of agile fiscal policy. 
Because of the decline in tax revenues due to the prolonged recession and 
the surge in social security costs due to aging, Japan’s debt to GDP ratio has 
steadily increased since the 1990s. In the past, the government promoted fiscal 
consolidation by trying to reduce the size of government debt through increasing 
taxes and restricting expenditures. For example, Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s cabinet, 
which came into office in January 1996, raised the consumption tax rate from 
three percent to five percent and implemented a strong fiscal consolidation policy. 
This had little success.10 
However, the consumption tax weakened consumption and investment, 
slowing the economy rapidly. Then the Asian financial crisis emerged in 1997, 
making the situation even worse. The Hashimoto cabinet left office in July 1998. 
Even when Koizumi came into office in April 2001, fiscal consolidation was a 
hot topic. The cabinet declared that it would issue treasury bonds worth no 
more than thirty trillion yen per year. However, it gave up its pledge a year later 
when the economic deterioration caused a decrease in tax revenue. In the end, 
the fiscal consolidation plan achieved some improvement in 2006-07, when the 
economic recovery had become clear. The DPJ, when it took over the 
government, reduced fiscal spending that focused on public works with the 
slogan of “from concrete to people” (konkirīto kara hito e). This shows that, even 
when the government changed, the major direction of fiscal consolidation did 
not.
On the other hand, unlike the previous governments, which had put fiscal 
consolidation at the forefront, the Abe administration included an aggressive 
fiscal policy in Abenomics. Indeed, the Abe administration expanded the 
budget for large-scale public works. It even proposed a revised budget if it 
became necessary. But this did not mean that there were no alternative plans for 
fiscal consolidation. The Abe administration also planned to achieve a surplus 
in the primary balance of the GDP ratio by 2020, considering it as an extension 
of social security and tax reform (shakai hoshō to zei no ittai kaikaku). However, 
as the pace of economic recovery slowed down due to the increase in the 
consumption tax in April 2014, the Abe administration postponed further 
increases in the consumption tax, and it could not achieve its goals. The Abe 
administration had learned from the preceding government that it is risky to 
10. In comparison with the previous year, annual expenditure decreased by 300 billion yen and 
revenues increased by two trillion yen in 1997.
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implement fiscal consolidation policies when the economy did not fully recover. 
It is likely to fail and increase a political burden. Rather than pursuing fiscal 
consolidation, Abe chose an aggressive fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate 
demand that would lead to an increase in tax revenues as the economy 
recovered. However, the government could not pursue fiscal expenditure 
endlessly. Thus, it decided to use an agile fiscal policy when the need arose. Just 
like the bold monetary policy, the agile fiscal policy emphasized the adjective 
“agile.” 
The Evaluation of Abenomics 
1. The Limitations of Quantitative Easing 
When Abenomics first emerged, the most important policy was the first arrow, 
the quantitative easing policy, which can be divided into four major periods. 
The first period lasted less than two years. The quantitative easing policy had 
started with the inauguration of Kuroda as the governor of the Bank of Japan in 
March 2013. But the first period lasted from December 2012, when Second Abe 
Cabinet came into the office, to October 2014, before the quantitative easing 
policy was expanded. With the implementation of Abenomics in January 2013, 
the Abe cabinet and Bank of Japan decided to use the money supply rather than 
the interest rate as a method of regulation for monetary policy. The cabinet also 
stated a two percent interest rate as the goal for inflation. The Bank of Japan 
announced that it would purchase long-term government bonds to achieve the 
goal. In April 2013, Kuroda, the governor of the Bank of Japan, announced that 
it would implement financial easing that was highly distinctive in both 
quantitative and qualitative ways. For specific plans to achieve a consumer price 
inflation of two percent within two years, the administration announced that it 
would increase the monetary base by sixty to seventy trillion yen every year, 
doubling the base within two years. It also said that it would purchase twice as 
many long-term government bonds. Moreover, it would purchase risk assets 
such as ETF or J-REIT. The announcement of Abenomics had a remarkable 
effect early on because Governor Kuroda clearly and firmly showed commitment 
to the goal of “two percent consumer price inflation” within two years. Because 
the monetary policy’s goals were beyond the expectation of the market, the 
value of the yen depreciated and share prices rose even before the specific policy 
was implemented.
The second period was from the announcement of quantitative and 
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qualitative easing in October 2014 to the introduction of negative interest rates 
in February 2016. Although the rosy outlook was dominant over the first year or 
so, the increase in the consumption tax in April 2014 (from five percent to eight 
percent) undermined the past achievements. When the US ended its third 
quantitative easing (QE3) in October 2014, the Japanese government became 
anxious that the deflationary mindset might continue for long. Japan needed a 
firmer commitment to prepare for expected inflation. Indeed, the Bank of Japan 
declared additional quantitative easing. It stated that it would increase the 
monetary base from sixty to seventy trillion yen to eighty trillion yen and the 
amount of long-term government bonds from fifty trillion yen to eighty trillion 
yen. It also added that it would purchase three trillion yen of the ETF and ninety 
billion yen of J-REIT, which were three times the previous sizes. 
The third period lasted from February to September 2016. It ranged from 
the introduction of quantitative and qualitative financial easing with negative 
interest rates to the introduction of quantitative and qualitative monetary easing 
accompanied by short and long-term interest rate adjustments. Quantitative 
easing, which had entered the third year of quantitative easing, gradually begun 
to show its limitations. First, it failed to achieve the inflation rate goal of two 
percent within two years. The increase in the monetary base failed to lead to an 
increase in money supply because commercial banks’ checking deposits in the 
central bank failed to attract business loans.11 This not only meant a failure to 
achieve the goal, but also created a problem of credibility. The Bank of Japan 
Governor Kuroda faced accusations that the credibility of his commitment had 
become the problem. Since Kuroda had emphasized the goal of “two percent 
within two years” in strong tones several times over the previous years, the 
impression that the Bank of Japan’s pledge had failed remained strong. In 
addition, the surprise of policy announcements became less effective. In the first 
year of Abenomics, the announcement effect of the government and Bank of 
Japan was quite large, but as the players in the market adapted to the new 
economic environment, their announcements no longer surprised economic 
agents. In the end, the Bank of Japan was forced to revise its existing quantitative 
and qualitative financial easing. 
11. The case of a corporation suffering from a recession in a balance sheet could be an example. If 
new borrowing is reduced in order to minimize debt, the amount of money supply will not 
increase, even if the monetary base increases. Moreover, a bank that has suffered bad debts in a 
long-term recession could be conservative when lending. If this happens, the money supply would 
not increase. For more information of the balance sheet recession theory, refer to Coo (2014, 
16-111).
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The introduction of the negative interest rate12 was expected to have a 
positive effect that would lead to a decline in the overall market interest, causing 
inflation to rise. This would spur consumption and investment. The yen would 
then depreciate, so exporting businesses would be more competitive. This would 
result in strong exports and high growth rates (Chŏng Chin-yŏng 2016, 16). 
However, there was little room for further interest rate decrease when the rate 
was already zero. As a result, the impact of the decline in interest rates for 
investment during the recession was minimal (Coo 2014, 16-111). In fact, Japan 
has a serious issue with population aging, and because interest is the main 
income source for elderly people, this might have caused a decrease in 
consumption. The biggest problem of all was that the introduction of negative 
interest rates worsened the profitability of banks. The decline in long-term 
interest rates had led to a reduction in loan-deposit margins, which resulted in 
financial difficulties, especially for local banks (Chŏng Chin-yŏng 2016, 12).13 As 
a result, the decrease in loan-deposit margins led to a reduction in the credit 
supply of banks. It also brought worries about the deterioration of corporate 
liquidity caused by the decrease in loans (“Ijigen kanwa,” 2016, 54-57).
The fourth period is from September 2016 to the present. This period 
represents quantitative and qualitative easing accompanied by short and long-
term interest rate adjustments. In September 2016, the Bank of Japan conducted 
a “comprehensive verification” (sōkatsuteki kenshō) on quantitative and qualitative 
financial easing. The comprehensive verification was necessary because the 
previous quantitative and qualitative financial easing failed to achieve the goal 
of two percent inflation within two years. In addition, the purchase of a large 
amount of government bonds had reached its limit, and the introduction of the 
negative interest rate did not produce a great effect. As a result, the government 
decided to buy government bonds to keep the long-term interest rate at zero 
percent (yield curve control) and continue to expand the supply of money to a 
level where the inflation rate was stable above two percent (overshooting 
commitment). Based on these two linchpins, the government started quantitative 
and qualitative financial easing with short and long-term interest rate 
adjustments.
12. The negative interest rate means a mechanism of taking a commission on checking accounts by 
applying minus 0.1 percent interest rate on some of the banks’ checking accounts of financial 
institutions. Since 2012, central banks of four European countries (July 2012 for Denmark, July 
2014 for Sweden, December 2014 for Switzerland, March 2016 for Hungary) and the ECB (June 
2014) implemented the negative interest rate. 
13. Because of the negative interest rate policy, the decline in local bank profits (minus fifteen 
percent) was twice as large as that of large banks (minus eight percent).
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Will these adjustments be able to achieve policy goals? There are two 
limitations. The first limitation is whether yield curve control is a feasible policy. 
Traditional financial policy achieved policy goals by adjusting short-term 
interest rates. While financial policy also affected long-term interest rates, 
expectations of market players ultimately decided them. This illustrates that 
long-term interest rates are not easy to adjust, and it is not necessarily desirable 
to distort the market. The second limitation is that the two linchpins send 
inconsistent signals. Yield curve control means that the interest rate of the long-
term government bonds will not fall to a negative level. In order to maintain 
this, the government may reduce the purchase of government bonds in certain 
cases. This implies that the Bank of Japan may pursue the opposite of financial 
easing. The Bank of Japan finally admitted that the bold monetary policy, the 
core of Abenomics, has reached its limit (Lee Chang-Min 2016, 39). The Bank of 
Japan was also aware of this and intended to raise expected inflation by 
declaring an overshooting commitment, which meant it would not stop 
financial easing, even if it achieved the policy goal. Due to the contradictory 
characteristics of the linchpins, the Bank of Japan sent out vague signals to 
economic agents. Thus, whether the Bank of Japan wanted an expansion of 
quantitative easing or an exit strategy became ambiguous. 
2. The Emergence of the “Weak Boom” (Teion Kōkyō)
Let us evaluate the performance of Abenomics according to its policy goals 
(two-percent consumer price inflation rate, three-percent nominal growth rate, 
two-percent real growth rate).14 As shown in figure 2, the performance of 
Abenomics can be assessed by dividing it into two periods on the basis of the 
inflation rate. The first period lasted from the announcement of Abenomics in 
December 2012 to the announcement of an increase in the consumption tax in 
April 2014. During this period, the consumer price inflation rate rose smoothly, 
from a negative rate to the stated two percent goal. However, in the second 
period, when the consumption tax was hiked, the inflation rate decreased again. 
In 2016, it returned to the negative level it was at before the start of Abenomics. 
The government had seemed to achieve the two percent goal in 2014. However, 
if one subtracts the effect from the increase in consumption tax, Abenomics 
14. For a short-term goal, Abenomics aimed to escape from deflation. For a medium-to-long-term 
goal, it seeks sustainable economic growth. In order to elucidate its policy goals, Abenomics stated 
goals numerically. A consumer price inflation of two percent, nominal growth rate of three 
percent, and real growth rate of two percent highlight the goals of Abenomics. 
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never really succeeded.15 As for economic growth, it has recovered under 
Abenomics. However, the government has not achieved the nominal growth 
rate of three percent and the real growth rate of two percent. After the increase 
in consumption tax, the real growth rate dropped sharply. As a result, the 
anticipated goals of Abenomics have failed because of the increase in the 
consumption tax in 2014. The Abe administration recognized this problem and 
postponed the second consumption tax hike (from eight percent to ten percent) 
from the scheduled October 2015 to April 2017. Then the government postponed 
the increase again to October 2019.
Although Abenomics has failed to meet its policy goals, the Japanese 
economy is experiencing its second longest post-war boom, as illustrated by the 
Composite Index. In March 2017, Abenomics surpassed the “bubble boom” 
(from December 1986 to February 1991, fifty-one months) which was the third 
longest boom in the post-war period. Then, in September 2017, it surpassed the 
Izanagi  boom, which was the second longest (from December 1965 to July 
1970, fifty-seven months). If Abenomics keeps pace, it will replace the record 
Izanami  boom, the longest boom in the postwar period (seventy-three months), 
by 2019. Figure 3 shows the Composite Index since 2000. The economic 
recovery that started with the launch of the Abe administration continued to 
rise until April 2014, accompanied by inflation and economic growth. Then it 
moved up and down within a certain range. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
economy is in a boom, the condition of the economy has remained relatively 
neutral. Indeed, the Japanese economy has been in a state of “weak boom” since 
the increase in the consumption tax. 
15. It is necessary to consider the drop in international oil prices since the second half of 2014. 
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Source:  Compiled by the author with raw data from Sōmushō (n.d.) and Naikakufu (n.d. b).
Figure 2. Consumption Price Inflation Rate and Growth Rate (%)
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What has supported the “weak boom” since April 2014? Abenomics’ major 
successes include the weakened yen, increase in stock prices, and improvement 
in employment. The yen/dollar exchange rate started at eighty yen at the end of 
2012 and continued to fluctuate, but it has remained at 110 yen since 2017.16 The 
average Nikkei stock price also began to fluctuate from 8,000 yen at the end of 
2012 to 20,000 yen in 2017 (as shown in figure 4). It is clear that there has been a 
tendency towards a weak yen and increased stock prices for five years under 
Abenomics. Data also show improvements in the employment rate. The full 
unemployment rate had been steadily declining and stayed at three percent 
since 2013. It fell to two percent in 2017, achieving virtually full employment. 
Job-to-applicant ratio, which means the number of jobs per laborer, rose steadily 
to 1.01 in November 2013. It was 1.63 as of December 2017.
The question is whether the weak yen tendency and rise in stock price led to 
an increase in exports and an increase in consumption as a mechanism of 
financial easing.17 As many critics of Abenomics pointed out, there was no clear 
correlation between the weak yen and exports. Regardless of the weak yen, 
exports hardly increased. In addition, there were discrepancies in profit gains 
between large corporations and small or medium-sized enterprises. Large 
16. Accessed January 2018.
17. About the mechanism for financial easing, see Okabe (2014, 3-6).
Source: Compiled by the author with raw data from Naikakufu (n.d. a).
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corporations operating on the global stage were expected to see earnings rise 
due to the decline in the value of the yen, even if exports themselves do not 
increase. However, SMEs operating domestically were at risk of worsening 
profitability due to rising raw material prices (Ryu Sang-yun and Yi Chi-p’yŏng 
2014, 25-26). Slowing consumption is also one of the biggest weaknesses of 
Abenomics.  
There was a slight rebound in 2013 and 2014 when there was last-minute 
surge in consumption (kakekomi shōhi). However, total consumption did not 
deviate from the long-term decline. The improvement in the consumption 
index and employment index was more a result of the change in population 
than the effect of Abenomics. 
The full unemployment rate peaked at 5.5 percent in July 2009, decreasing to 
four percent in 2011. The job-to-applicant ratio also turned upward since 2009, 
inversely proportional to the unemployment rate. In fact, the labor force 
population started to decline in 1999. After ten years, the total population 
declined in 2008-09. As a result, the unemployment rate declined naturally and 
the job-to-applicant ratio has increased.
The value of the yen as a safe asset has declined due to the recovery of the 
world economy, and the Japanese economy has begun to recover as large public 
investment and capital investment by enterprises increase. However, it is hard to 
say that recovery and growth have reached a stable level, as Abenomics aimed to 
achieve autonomous growth led by domestic demand. Due to the decline in the 
workforce, employment indicators have improved. As a result, however, the 
































































































































































































Source:  The exchange rate is from time-series statistic of Bank of Japan. The stock price 
data is compiled by the author with data from Nihon keizai shinbun (Japanese 
Economic Newspaper).
Figure 4. Exchange Rate (dollar/yen) and Stock Price (Nikkei Stock Average)
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due to Japan’s rigid employment system. The rise in income is uncertain and 
there is no confidence in the future, so consumption has not revived. It is true 
that the bold quantitative easing policy has somewhat resolved the prolonged 
period of helplessness in Japanese society, but it has not completely eliminated 
the prevailing deflation. In the end, the Japanese economy, which was already in 
a weakened condition, met with a positive external environment and created a 
special situation called a “weak boom.”
The Change of Direction for Abenomics after 2016
1. The Unspecified Growth Strategy
Growth strategies and structural reforms go hand-in-hand. The long-term 
growth of the economy follows the increase in potential GDP. To increase the 
potential GDP, it is necessary to reform the country’s economic structure. The 
reform of the economic structure should create an environment in which 
companies and workers can work efficiently and stably under fair rules. The 
third approach of Abenomics, the growth strategy for promoting private 
investment, aims to reform the economic structure in order to address the 
problem of aggregate supply constraints. In fact, there were voices pointing out 
the importance of structural reform since the late 1980s. The Maekawa Report, 
written in 1986 by the Nakasone Yasuhiro cabinet, claimed that Japan needed to 
improve the surplus trade structure with the US and reform the economic 
structure that had supported rapid growth. It was a bold policy proposal back 
then, but it became a milestone, as structural reforms appeared in each successive 
government. 
In the 1990s, as the economic recession continued and structural problems 
such as low fertility and aging began to appear, interest in structural reform 
became more important (see table 2). In 1995, the Murayama cabinet announced 
structural reforms in ten areas to deal with the strong yen and problem of low 
productivity. In 1996, the Hashimoto cabinet issued six major reforms. Its fiscal 
reform aimed at consolidation, but it was largely ineffective due to the economic 
downturn. By contrast, the Obuchi cabinet, which succeeded Hashimoto, 
expanded its fiscal spending in order to recover the economy. Apart from the 
fiscal spending, the Obuchi cabinet announced various structural reforms for 
sustainable growth.18 Koizumi’s structural reforms have been discussed above. 
18. For the summary of structural reforms from previous governments, see Nakanomyō (2003, 
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Thus, it is evident that Japanese governments have announced similar reforms 
on various structural problems of the Japanese economy, including low fertility, 
aging, deteriorating fiscal soundness, and rigid labor market since the 1990s. 
Not only the LDP, but also the DPJ, which took over in September 2009, 
announced its structural reform plan under the name of “New Growth Strategy” 
(Shin Seichō Senryaku) in December 2009.19 The six major focus areas included 
energy, health, Asian economy, tourism, regional vitalization, science and 
4-7). 
19. About the economic policy of the DPJ, see Masuda (2009, 10-20). 
Table 2. Structural Reforms of Cabinets in the 1990s
Date of 
Announcement Cabinet
The Name of 
Policy Contents
April 1986 Nakasone The Maekawa 
Report (The 





Housing and urban development projects 
for the expansion of the domestic 
market 
Transformation of industrial structure 
Improvement for market access and 
promotion for imports
Liberalization of financial market and 
globalization of yen
December 1995 Murayama Economic and 
Social Plan for 
Structural 
Reform
High cost reduction and vitalization 
measures in ten fields (logistics, 
energy, distribution, telecommunica- 
tion, finance, passenger transportation, 
agriculture, licensing, public works, 
housing construction)
December 1996 Hashimoto Six Major 
Reforms
Administrative reform, financial reform, 
social security reform, economic 
reform, financial system reform, 
educational reform




Economic recovery and sustainable 
finance 
Building a healthy competitive society
Building a financial system
Industrial revitalization with 
international competitiveness
Infrastructure investment and local 
revitalization
Source: Nakanomyō (2003, 4-7).
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technology, and human resources. After the Koizumi cabinet, Japan experienced 
six years of political and economic turmoil. In December 2012, when the second 
Abe cabinet took office, the government suggested a growth strategy that 
promoted investment, as per the third arrow of Abenomics. In addition, the 
“Japan Rehabilitation Strategy” released in June 2013 announced a more concrete 
growth plan. The strategy stated the necessity of overcoming the existing 
systems, laws, and practices that hindered private investment. It also presented 
plans for promoting new entrants, rebuilding the economic infrastructure for 
globalization, and expanding government support for the development and 
practical use of advanced technologies.
There were many other contents in the “Japan Reconstruction Strategy.” 
However, there were no major differences from the structural reforms or long-
term growth strategies previously pursued by the LDP government. Even when 
compared to the DPJ’s “New Growth Strategy,” there were no significant 
differences except the plans for the national strategic zone, reactivation of 
nuclear power plants, and corporate tax cuts (Ch’oe Hŭi-sik 2013, 181). As a 
result, Abenomics’ growth strategy has been criticized from the beginning as a 
mere slogan that lacks an authentic agenda. The reason that Abenomics’ growth 
strategy has the same characteristics of all previous policies is as follows. First, as 
explained above, the structural problems of the Japanese economy are so 
obvious that all Japanese know them. Because the problems are obvious, the 
government cannot help to propose similar measures to deal with them. Second, 
the government can do only a limited range of things with the growth strategy. 
Unlike the aggregate demand policy, which is expected to have a direct and 
immediate effect, the growth strategy, which is an aggregate supply policy, is an 
indirect and medium-term strategy. In essence, the government needs to 
improve the investment environment to attract private investors. This will lead 
to gradual economic growth.
The Abe cabinet emphasized quantitative easing rather than structural 
reform. It was a policy decision indicating that aggregate demand shortage was a 
more serious problem than the aggregate supply constraint. Moreover, the Abe 
cabinet was under pressure to produce an economic recovery via their economic-
focused policies as soon as possible. In fact, it was not easy to suggest structural 
reforms, which take time to see effects (Park Young-June 2014, 88).20 When 
Prime Minister Koizumi came into office in April 2001, the approval rate of his 
cabinet exceeded eighty percent. Based upon this high approval rate, Koizumi 
20. In an interview with Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Abe said that the priority of the second 
Abe cabinet is to eliminate deflation and restore the Japanese economy. 
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sought thorough structural reform. Takenaka Heizō, who served as minister of 
state for eonomic and fiscal service and minister of state for financial services, 
took charge of these drastic reforms. Despite the effort, there was negative 
growth at the beginning of the Koizumi administration. It led his approval 
ratings to drop to forty percent in June 2002. However, the effect of the structural 
reforms emerged gradually. The ratio of non-performing loans was decreased 
and many zombie companies were eliminated. Japanese corporations made 
structural improvement in industries. The exports were strong as a result of the 
weak yen, leading the Japanese economy to recover. Koizumi maintained an 
approval rate of forty percent and retired in September 2006 during the longest 
post-war boom. Abe, who served as chief cabinet secretary, was second-in-
command during the Koizumi administration. Serving in the Koizumi cabinet, 
Abe closely observed that the success of the economic policy led to the high 
approval rate. 
2. Structural Limitations: The Importance of Labor Reform 
The year 2016 was an inflection point for Abenomics. First, there were two great 
fluctuations in the quantitative easing policy, the introduction of negative 
interest rates in February and the introduction of short and long-term interest 
rate adjustments in September. In October 2015, Abe labeled the next three 
years as the “second stage of Abenomics,” and announced a slogan that Japan 
aimed to become a society that would promote “All Hundred Million Taking 
Active Parts in Society” (ichioku sōkatsuyaku shakai). At the same time, Abe 
announced three new arrows for Abenomics. They included a strong and 
hopeful economy, supportive childcare, and reassuring social security. It merged 
the existing three arrows into a single, “strong economy” arrow and added two 
new social security measures. As a result, the first “Hundred Million Active 
National Congress” was held on October 29, 2015, and the “Japan Hundred 
Million Total Action Plan” was decided on June 9, 2016, at the 9th meeting. 
After 2016, Abenomics shifted its focus from quantitative easing to growth 
strategy (or structural reform).
There are two interpretations for this change of direction for Abenomics. 
One interpretation is that Abenomics’ quantitative easing policy had reached its 
limit (Han’guk Kŭmyung Yŏn’guwŏn 2015, 20).21 As mentioned above, the 
21. Quantitative easing alone could not achieve the two percent inflation rate. Because of the 
increase in consumption tax, private consumption shrank. The decline in the fertility rate and 
aging caused a decrease in the labor force, and it resulted in the problem of productivity decline. It 
was clear that Abenomics could not deal with all these problems by itself.  
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introduction of negative interest rates and the adjustment of short and long-
term interest rates were measures to boost the effects of quantitative easing or 
offset its side effects. The other interpretation is that Abenomics is working 
according to its original plan to “use quantitative easing first for economic 
recovery and when the economy starts to turn around, structural reform will 
take over” (Taniguchi 2015, 1).22 Abenomics did not meet its goal because the 
increase in the consumption tax hindered the economic boom. However, 
looking at the Japanese economy in the long run, it did turn around in October 
2015 when the second stage of Abenomics was in action. Recognizing the 
limitations of Abenomics and evaluating Abenomics as a half-success is essentially 
the same. Each approach admits that Abenomics needed a change of direction 
after three years. The change turned out to be dealing with supply constraint 
problems through a more concrete growth strategy, rather than demand shortage 
problems.
The slogan of “All Hundred Million Taking Active Parts in Society” represents 
the plan to sustain a population of one hundred million who can play roles at 
home, work, and the regional community even after fifty years. The concrete 
means to achieve such a society are the three new arrows described above—
strong economy, child care support, and social security. The goal of a strong 
economy is to increase nominal GDP to 600 trillion yen by 2020. To achieve this 
goal, the government plans to promote a productivity revolution by fully 
expanding the employment of women, workers, and disabled people. In 
addition, it plans to revitalize the local economy. Regarding child care support, 
the government plans to raise the fertility rate, which is currently 1.4, to 1.8 by 
2025. In order to reduce the economic burden related to child rearing, the 
government is willing to support free education for early childhood and 
infertility treatment care. The social security plan involves improving elderly 
care facilities to reduce the loss of employment caused by family nursing. In 
addition, the government intends to expand the social security system by 
supporting elderly households, including pensions. The new three arrows 
concentrate on the problem of supply, exemplified by the lack of labor force 
brought about by the low birth rate and aging society (Han’guk Kŭmyung 
Yŏn’guwŏn 2015. 21).
The success of the second stage of Abenomics depends on the success of 
labor reform. The third Abe cabinet, which was established in August 2016, 
22. The three arrows of Abenomics represent time order. An expansionary financial policy comes 
first to create a breakthrough for deflation. Then an expansionary fiscal policy accelerates the 
process to eliminate deflation. Finally, stabilize the economy and promote sustainability through 
deregulation.
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appointed Katō Katsunobu as minister for working style reform (hatarakikata 
kaikaku tantō daijin). In September, the government launched the “Reform for 
Working Style Conference.” The government also suggested equal pay for the 
same work, ending long working hours, and the promotion of employment for 
the elderly as specific action plans for working-style reform. The government 
emphasized labor reform because the labor shortage continues even though the 
unemployment rate has fallen to near full employment. Despite the unemploy- 
ment rate falling below three percent in 2017, the job-to-applicant ratio exceeded 
1.6, worsening the labor shortage. The labor shortage at near full employment 
means that the economy is close to its potential GDP, but the lack of labor force 
is constraining economic growth. 
Usually, as the total and working-age populations decrease, the labor force 
also decreases. However, after the implementation of Abenomics, the total 
population and the working-age population decreased, but the labor force 
increased.23 From 2013 to 2016, the total population decreased by 560,000, from 
127.31 million to 126.75 million. On the other hand, the labor force population 
increased by 710,000, from 65.77 million to 66.48 million. This is because 
women, elderly people, and foreign workers who used to be categorized as a 
non-labor force in the working-age population entered the labor market. Full-
time housewives who left the labor market due to pregnancy, childbirth, and 
child care entered the labor market again, and those over sixty-five years of age 
continued to remain in the labor market through the “continued employment 
system”. In addition, Abenomics’ positive employment policy for foreign 
workers attracted many foreigners to enter the labor market.
However, women, the elderly, and foreigners comprise a higher proportion 
of non-regular workers to regular workers, and non-regular workers have a 
relatively lower wage. Low wages lead to a decline in consumption, which results 
in a reduction in aggregate demand. Consequently, the reduction in aggregate 
demand does not create a virtuous cycle for economic recovery. Companies are 
also required to provide continuous employment for the elderly. This can cause 
problems of productivity deterioration, and productivity deterioration leads to 
aggregate supply constraint in the long run. The bigger problem is that the shift 
of the non-labor force population to the labor force population cannot be a 
solution in the long run. As the working-age population continues to decline, 
23. The working-age population in Japan has started to decline since 1999. The total population 
also started to decline in 2008. In the 1950s and 1970s, the increasing rate of the working-age 
population surpassed the increasing rate of the total population. However, in the 2000s, the 
decreasing rate of the working-age population surpassed the decreasing rate of the total 
population. 
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the process of pushing the non-labor force population into low-wage non-
regular jobs will soon face limitations. Therefore, Abenomics’ change of 
direction is based on the recognition that these existing growth strategies cannot 
help the Japanese economy escape from recession or promote long-term growth.
In the end, the key to labor reform depends on the reform of Japanese labor 
practices. Under Abenomics, the wage level is declining while employment 
indicators are improving. A possible reason for this contradiction is Japanese 
labor practices, which include long-term employment and the seniority wage 
system.24 Managers are cautious about the base salary increase, which increases 
fixed costs, so even if the company’s performance improves, it is not returned to 
the household as wages. As a result, private consumption does not improve. The 
Japanese labor practices place high risks on changing jobs and retirement. This 
increases the opportunity cost for childbirth or childcare, creating difficulties 
for women to reenter the market. Moreover, the wage gap between regular and 
non-regular workers is also related to the high risks of changing jobs and 
retirement, which are directly linked to the problem of lower productivity. 
These risks have led workers to be specialized for their companies only. 
Moreover, there are problems with working overtime and hospitality customs. 
Therefore, the reform of Japanese labor practices is a fundamental measure to 
solve the aggregate supply constraint, and the shift of Abenomics occurred as a 
result.
Conclusion
The three arrows of Abenomics prior to 2016 are as follows. The first arrow was 
bold financial easing that expanded the unlimited quantitative easing that had 
been implemented since the Koizumi administration. The second arrow was the 
agile fiscal policy designed to aggressively implement fiscal stimulus. The policy 
was chosen because the Abe administration could not increase the fiscal 
expenditure forever while not bound by fiscal consolidation like previous 
administrations. Finally, the third arrow was the growth strategy that consolidated 
all the long-term growth strategies of the previous administrations. The second 
Abe cabinet, inaugurated in December 2012, concentrated on bold financial 
easing as the prime mover to start Abenomics. First, Abe planned an expansionary 
monetary policy to escape from deflation. This was followed by an expansionary 
24. There are various explanations for the irony of the decline of wages in the labor market. For 
more information, see Genda (2017).
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fiscal policy to accelerate the escape. Finally, he planned to promote steady 
economic growth through various growth strategies.
The economy under Abenomics seems to be booming. However, it is a 
“weak boom,” which is difficult to notice. It failed to achieve the policy goals of 
a two-percent inflation rate, a three-percent nominal growth rate, and a two-
percent actual growth rate. On the other hand, there are a number of experts 
who consider the weak yen, the increase in stock prices, and the low unemploy- 
ment rate as a success for Abenomics. However, Abenomics does not solely 
affect fluctuations in the value of the yen and fluctuations in the average Nikkei 
stock prices. There are other determinants. In addition to US political 
circumstances and the Federal Reserve Bank’s interest rate policy, the economic 
condition of Europe and emerging economies affect the value of the yen in the 
international market. The Japanese stock market then reflects this. Thus, while 
Abenomics could be one of the reasons for the increase in stock prices, it is an 
overestimation to say that Abenomics has been solely responsible for the weak 
yen and stock market. In addition, employment has increased, in part due to the 
improvement in corporate earnings since the implementation of Abenomics. 
However, the fundamental cause for the fall in unemployment is the labor 
shortage, which constrains the labor supply. 
In essence, it is clear that Japan must overcome the problem of aggregate 
supply constraints, not aggregate demand shortages, in order to escape from the 
long-term recession. The key to the problem of aggregate supply constraints is 
labor reform. Japan needs to reform its labor practices and working style in 
order to sustain a society that maintains a population of one hundred million 
people who play a role at home, work, and regional communities even after fifty 
years. The original prescription for Abenomics focused on converting the non-
labor force population to the labor force population. But this cannot be the 
ultimate solution for the long-term shortage of labor. In the end, the success of 
the second stage of Abenomics and the recovery of the Japanese economy are all 
dependent on the success of the labor reforms. 
• Translated by JEON Hae Jeong
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